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PITCHERS COMMUNICATION 
ELECTRONICS, a corporation, 
DWIGHT PITCHER, VERNA PITCHER, 
and JOHN DOES I and II, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the lower court err in failing to properly value 
the assets of the partnership at the time of its dissolution? 
2. Did the lower court err in failing to properly 
compute the liability of Plaintiff for the partnership debts? 
3. Did the lower court err in computing the amount of 
rent to be debited against Plaintiff and, in the alternative, 
did the lower court err in failing to exclude the rent for the 
business premises and the rent of two base radio stations from 
the obligation of Plaintiff when such claims were barred by 
the doctrine of laches? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a dispute arising from an agreement entered into 
between Plaintiff and Defendant for the purpose of engaging in 
the sale and repair of electronic equipment. Each party 
claimed that the other party had breached the terms of the 
agreement and was therefore liable for damages. 
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW 
This matter was tried to the Honorable Richard C. Davidson 
on September 16, 1985. The lower court subsequently entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and awarded 
approximately $11,000 to the defendant against the plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This lawsuit arose as a result of the business relationship 
between plaintiff Robert Sather and defendant William Pitcher, Jr. 
While it is undisputed that the two men had a business relation-
ship for a number of years the extent of that relationship and 
the contribution of each was hotly contested. Because this 
appeal is only concerned with limited issues, it is unnecessary 
to go into extensive detail as to this relationship. However, 
a brief summary of the testimony of each side is useful in 
understanding the decision of the lower court and the errors 
now claimed by Appellant on this appeal. 
TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANTS 
Mr. William E. Pitcher, Jr. testified that he had known 
the plaintiff Robert Sather for a number of years before he 
began a business dealing with him in 1971. In April of that 
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year he became an employee for Mr. Sather in the repair of 
radios and televisions and worked from the basement of Mrc 
Satherfs jewelry store in Roosevelt, Utah. (Tr. of September 
16, 1985, p. 3). According to Mr. Pitcher, during the first 
six months of 19 72 it was decided that Mr. Pitcher would 
become an equal partner with Mr. Sather in the electronic 
and communication business and accordingly an agreement was 
drawn up by Mr. Sather1s attorney Jim Hall outlining this 
relationship. (Tr. p. 6, 15). 
Exhibit 2 is a document entitled "Agreement" which is 
actually a carbon copy of the document prepared by Mr. Hall. 
Pages 1 and 2 constitute the terms of the agreement but are 
unsigned. Page 3 is an extra page from a previous draft 
which was used by the parties to add additional terms on the 
backside of that page. There are notations in blue ink and in 
black ink on the reverse side of page 3. (Ex. 2). These 
notations have also been initialed by both parties and while 
the first page of the typed agreement is dated January 1, 1972 
the written additions are dated July 1, 1972. 
Mr. Pitcher explained that while originally he was to 
receive a fixed percentage of the labor and parts used in 
the electronics business that it was later decided that the two 
men would become equal partners in the business. Accordingly, 
one of the notations contained on the back of page 3 stated 
that paragraph 3 of the original agreement would be changed 
to a "partnership". According to Mr. Pitcher, this notation 
which was written in black ink was added by him to other terms 
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written by Mr. Sather in blue ink. Mr. Sather initialed page 
3 to acknowledge this partnership relationship as well as the 
other terms written in blue ink by Mr. Sather himself. (Tr. 
pp. 10-13). 
For the convenience of this Court and the parties 
Plaintiff has included a copy of the "Agreement" as a part 
of the Addendum to this Brief. The Agreement basically 
requires plaintiff Sather to furnish a shop from which the 
business could be conducted, to furnish necessary equipment 
and inventory for the business, and to furnish a suitable 
service truck for the business. Defendant Pitcher agreed to 
spend his full time and effort in the business and to operate 
it in a good and workmanlike manner. The parties agreed that 
"at least monthly" an accounting shall be had both as to 
labor and parts and that Pitcher would pay his own social 
security, income tax, and workmensf compensation. It was 
also agreed that all the expenses of the business, rent, 
utilities, taxes and other necessary business expenses would 
be deducted before any division of profits. Paragraph 8 provided 
that Pitcher would have the option "during the term of this 
Agreement to purchase the entire business" and that the purchase 
price would be determined "on the basis of the cost of equipment, 
less depreciation, plus all of the inventory of parts, tubes, 
supplies, etc." Finally, the agreement stated that it could 
be terminated by either party at any time and that an accounting 
would be given within three days after such termination. 
(Ex. 2) . 
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During 1972 Mr. Pitcher worked in the basement of the 
Sather jewelry store. According to him he had about $1,200 
worth of test equipment provided by Mr. Sather and about 
$1,200 worth of inventory parts. (Tr. pp. 20, 32). Because 
the parties decided to expand the radio and television repair 
service to the servicing and rental of two-way communication 
equipment, it was necessary to buy additional test equipment 
and to increase the inventory. Accordingly, approximately 
$7,000 for new equipment was purchased by the company using 
Sather*s credit but paying it out of the company account. 
(Tr. pp. 32-34). 
In 19 73 equipment was leased from General Electric for 
the purpose of transmitting mobile telephone conversations. 
The equipment was erected on Blue Mountain by Mr. Pitcher and 
the land was leased from the Bureau of Land Management by 
Mr. Sather. (Tr. pp. 21-22). This repeater system which was 
leased from General Electric and placed upon Blue Mountain 
permitted two-way communication between the two base stations 
(also leased from General Electric) contained at Mr. Satherfs 
Vernal store and his Roosevelt store. In addition, the 
repeater system enabled two-way communication between mobile 
telephone units owned by Mr. Sather as well as other companies 
which were leased time on the system. (Tr. pp.23-25). 
Additional equipment was purchased from Motorola during 1973 
for the use of the electronic business. This equipment is 
listed on Exhibit 4. 
In 19 73 as well as in the following years all business 
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payments were made from the company account and the checks 
were signed exclusively by Mr. Sather. Whenever Mr. Pitcher 
wanted a salary draw he would request it and Mr. Sather would 
accordingly execute a check. (Tr. p. 29). Payment for the 
subsequently bought equipment as well as other expenses always 
came from the company account. (Tr. p. 34). 
Because it was necessary to repair two-way radios in 
the vehicles of customers it became very inconvenient to do 
so when the vehicles could not be worked upon in the shop. 
In December of 19 73, therefore, the company was relocated 
from the jewelry store basement to a building approximately one 
mile east of Roosevelt which was owned by the defendant. The 
building was, according to Mr. Pitcher, in good shape since it 
had recently been remodeled. Pitcher claimed that he paid for 
these repairs himself and that Mr. Sather did not assist in 
any way in upgrading his building. As soon as the building 
was prepared he moved all of the test equipment and inventory 
into it in approximately January of 1974. (Tr. p. 32). 
Defendant produced an exhibit prepared by his bookkeeper 
and daughter-in-law Verna Pitcher which he claimed summarized 
the business operations of the company between 1973 and 19 78. 
This summary showed an operating loss of $1,800 in 1973, a 
profit of $430 in 1974, a profit of $1,500 in 1975, a profit 
of $160 in 1976, a loss of $2,600 in 1977, and a loss of $7,400 
in 19 78. The exhibit also showed that while total sales in 
19 73 were only approximately $10,500 they had grown to over 
$38,000 in 1978. (Ex. 5). Defendant Pitcher stated that while 
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he did not give Mr. Sather this type of accounting summary 
each year he did provide him sufficient information so that 
Sather could do his own income tax. (Tr. p. 43). 
In 1978, according to Pitcher, he became dissatisfied 
with the business relationship between himself and Mr. Sather 
and wanted to buy Mr. Sather out under the terms of the agree-
ment. Pitcher stated that Sather would not live up to his 
part of the agreement and every time the witness wanted to do 
something Sather would put his thumb down on it. He offered 
to give Sather $9,000 to buy him out but this offer was never 
accepted. (Tr. pp. 188-190) . Accordingly, in January of 1979 
he formed his own company with his son. (Tr. p. 188). He 
changed the name of his business and opened a separate checking 
account at a new bank. He received a separate IRS and State 
tax identification number and began paying all of his accounts 
under his new business name. (Tr. pp. 190-191). At this time 
all of the test equipment, communication equipment, and inventory 
which was acquired during the Sather business relationship was 
transferred into the new corporation. (Tr. pp. 51-53). 
Subsequently, Pitcher testified that when the lease for the 
Blue Mountain facility came up for renewal that he changed it 
over from the Sather Communication company to his own company. 
The repeater equipment acquired during the Sather business 
relationship, still remained on the mountain. He did not 
inform Mr. Sather of his intention to transfer this lease to 
his own company. (Tr. pp. 45-46, 54). 
In 1981 defendant Pitcher related that he went to Mr. 
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Sather's two jewelry stores and removed the two base stations 
which were installed. He did this because he figured the 
equipment belonged to the business and since Mr. Sather was 
not paying any rent on the equipment he believed he was 
entitled to repossess it. Later, he was served with a writ 
of replevin concerning that equipment which began the present 
lawsuit. (Tr. pp. 192-193). 
Pitcher claimed that Sather owed him approximately $20,000 
from their business relationship which included the rental of 
the base stations, the rental of his own building which Sather 
was obligated to pay, as well as some miscellaneous charges 
for electronic work performed for the jewelry store. (Tr. 
pp. 193-195). 
TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE OF PLAINTIFFS 
Plaintiff Robert Sather described the business relationship 
between the two parties in an entirely different manner. Mr. 
Sather stated that it was never his intention on making Pitcher 
a partner but that the two had agreed that Pitcher would receive 
a percentage split for the work which he performed while employed 
by Sather. Mr. Sather explained that when he initialed the 
"Agreement" (Ex. 2) that it did not contain the words "change 
No. 3 to partnership" and that this language was subsequently 
added in black ink after Sather had agreed to the other terms. 
(Tr. p. 107). Sather stated that he would not be a partner 
with a man who had several judgments against him and who could 
not be responsible for credit. (Tr. p. 117). It was partly 
for this reason that Sather signed all the company checks from 
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1973 through 1978. (Tr. p. 117). 
Sather maintained that there was over $6,500 in equipment 
and inventory in 1971 when Pitcher began his employment. (Tr. 
p. 146). Sather acknowledged that Pitcher spent his sole 
effort in the business between 1973 and 1978 but believed that 
he had met his obligations under the agreement by supplying 
the equipment, inventory, and other items which Pitcher would 
have been unable to obtain on his own account. (Tr. pp. 108-113, 
128) . 
Mr. Sather testified that he purchased materials for the 
repair of Pitcher's building in which the company was later 
located. (Tr. 115; Ex. 22). He further testified that he 
frequently used his share of commissions from the sale of 
equipment to fund necessary expenditures. (Tr. p. 127). He 
stated that during this period of time he never filed a 
partnership tax return nor made any claims that he was in 
partnership with Pitcher. (Tr. p. 119). 
He acknowledged that in 1978 Pitcher made an offer to 
buy him out of the business but Mr. Sather stated that since 
he was never given an opportunity to examine the company books 
he had no idea what the value of the company was and therefore 
refused any offer. (Tr. p. 115). He stated that he never 
had received an accounting from Pitcher during the entire 
tenure of the relationship. (Tr. p. 114). He testified that 
he believed that Pitcher was a fair and honest person and 
therefore did not want to bother him by asking him for the 
accountings required by the agreement. On several occasions 
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he did receive brief summaries at the end of each year which 
he then gave to his bookkeeper for tax purposes. (Tr. p. 137) . 
Sather stated that he never was formally notified by 
Pitcher that the agreement had been terminated. He was not 
aware of it until the company bank account was closed by 
Pitcher. (Tr. p. 143). Later, Pitcher entered his stores 
in Roosevelt and Vernal and told the employees that the 
equipment had to be repaired. When Sather called Pitcher 
several days later to find out about the status of the base 
stations he was told by Pitcher that he was going to keep the 
machines since they belonged to the company and since Sather 
had not paid rent on them. (Tr. pp. 158-159). Since Sather 
felt that he had paid for these stations and that Pitcher 
was not entitled to remove them he filed an action for replevin 
in 1981. (Tr. pp. 150-151). He further testified that he 
never authorized Mr. Pitcher to utilize the test equipment, 
communication equipment, and inventory in Pitcherfs own elec-
tronics business. He stated that he requested an accounting 
from Mr. Pitcher prior to the time the lawsuit was initiated 
but that it was never given. (Tr. pp. 118-121). In 1981 the 
Internal Revenue Service levied on the plaintiff's bank account 
and collected approximately $2,000 which was owing by the 
company for the 1972-1978 period. (Tr. p. 167). 
Morris Casperson, a CPA employed by Mr. Sather, testified 
that he had examined the original documents given to him by 
Defendant and that his calculations showed that substantial 
profits had been made in the business between 1973 and 19 78. 
-10-
(Tr. pp. 97-98). 
A one-day trial was held before the Honorable Richard C. 
Davidson on September 16, 1985. After listening to the testimony 
the court ruled in favor of the defendants and against the 
plaintiff. A copy of the transcript relating to the court's 
decision is contained in the Addendum. Subsequently, Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law together with a Judgment were 
entered by the lower court. These documents are also included 
in the Addendum. It is from this Judgment that this appeal 
is taken. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The lower court incorrectly assessed the value of 
the assets at the time the "partnership" was dissolved. The 
court failed to follow established rules that the market value 
of all property must be considered in assessing assets and 
liabilities of partners in a dissolved partnership. Since 
there was substantial equipment remaining in the partnership 
at the time of its dissolution Plaintiff was seriously prejudiced 
by not being given credit for the existing market value of that 
equipment. 
2. The lower court erred in incorrectly computing the 
business losses for which Plaintiff was ultimately held liable. 
There was no evidence to support the amount awarded by the 
lower court nor did the lower court give Plaintiff credit for 
the money he paid on behalf of the company to the Internal 
Revenue Service. 
-11-
3. The lower court failed to properly compute the 
amount owing for the alleged rental of Defendant's building 
since there is no evidence to justify the amount awarded. 
In the alternative, the lower court should not have awarded 
any amount of rent towards the building or towards the base 
stations contained in Plaintiff's jewelry stores since the 
doctrine of laches precludes Defendant from now asserting 
these claims. 
ARGUMENT 
It was the position of the plaintiff in the lower court 
that he had not entered into a partnership agreement with 
defendant Pitcher. Rather, Plaintiff maintained that Pitcher 
was an employee who had agreed for a fixed percentage of the 
business profits. The lower court specifically rejected the 
contentions of Plaintiff and found that a partnership agreement 
had been created between the two parties and that each was 
an equal partner of the other. (Tr. pp. 214-216; 128-129). 
Although Plaintiffs do not agree with the conclusion reached 
by the lower court with regard to the partnership determination, 
Plaintiffs recognize that the evidence was conflicting and 
that on appeal credance must be given to the lower court's 
judgment in those instances where there is sufficient evidence 
to justify the lower court's ruling. For this reason, therefore, 
Plaintiffs do not contest in this appeal the finding of the 
lower court that an equal partnership existed between the two 
parties. 
Assuming that there was a partnership agreement entered 
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into in 19 72 then the termination of this agreement by the 
defendant in late 19 78 can only be termed as a dissolution 
of partnership. Accordingly, this action regardless of the 
terminology used by the parties in the lower court must be 
deemed an accounting of a defunct partnership entity. As 
such, this becomes a suit in equity rather than in law. 
It is the responsibility of this Court, therefore, to review 
both questions of fact and law as is mandated by the Utah 
Constitution. Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 9. 
Even so, Plaintiffs recognize that this Court will review 
questions generally in the light most favorable to the 
findings of the trial court and will reverse only if the 
evidence or lack of it renders it clearly necessary to do 
so. West v. West, 403 P.2d 22 (Utah 1965); Nepetco Associates 
v. Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877 (Utah 1983). 
Based upon the preceding principles Plaintiffs maintain 
that the lower court erred in its valuation of the partnership 
entity and erroneously awarded Defendants an amount to which 
they were not entitled. 
Essentially, Plaintiffs object to Findings of Fact Nos. 
8, 9, 10 and 11 together with Conclusions of Law 4 and 5. 
These objections will now be discussed in detail. 
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
ASSESS THE PARTNERSHIP ASSETS AS TO 
THEIR MARKET VALUE AT THE TIME THE 
PARTNERSHIP WAS DISSOLVED. 
Finding No. 8 of the lower court stated: 
When defendant terminated the business on 
December 31, 1978, Plaintiff was entitled to 
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receive one-half of the value of the assets at 
that time. The assets of the partnership on 
December 31, 197 8, included equipment which was 
fully depreciated and had no value and inventory 
of approximately $13,000. (Tr. pp. 129-130). 
(Emphasis added). 
It is undisputed that at the time the partnership terminated 
in 1978 Defendant retained a substantial amount of testing as 
well as communication equipment. As previously noted in the 
Statement of Facts, it was necessary for Defendant to substan-
tially increase the amount of test equipment used in the business 
during the five years of operation because of the expanded nature 
of the business. All of this testing equipment was paid for out 
of the company account. In addition, substantial equipment was 
located on Blue Mountain for the purpose of transmitting two-way 
communication signals. This equipment which again was purchased 
from the company account was later transferred into the name of 
Defendant's company and produced income for the following years. 
(Tr. pp. 175-180). 
It is important to consider that this action was not 
initiated by Defendant Pitcher against Sather for enforcement 
of the partnership agreement. Had Pitcher in 19 78 sought 
specific performance of the partnership agreement and specifi-
cally paragraph 8 of that agreement relating to his option to 
purchase,then the lower court would have been correct in 
evaluating the assets as it did. However, Pitcher chose instead 
to terminate the agreement pursuant to paragraph 11 and to begin 
his own separate company. 
Thus, the term of the agreement had expired without Pitcher 
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ever exercising his option to purchase the business on the 
basis of the cost of the equipment less depreciation. Instead, 
Pitcher dissolved the partnership agreement and was then subject 
to an accounting based upon normal partnership principles. 
It is fundamental that an accounting must be based on the 
market value of partnership assets at the time of dissolution. 
Cave v. Cave, 474 P.2d 480 (N.M. 1970); 68 C.J.S., Partnership, 
§387, p. 900-901. Further, the value of the assets for purpose 
of accounting is ordinarily determined as of the date of the 
dissolution. Id. at p. 901. 
The finding of the lower court makes no sense in the context 
of this case. If, for example, the two parties in this case 
had purchased a house in which defendant operated the business 
and depreciated the house to a zero basis during the tenure of 
the partnership, it could hardly be said that the house had no 
value whatsoever and that the plaintiff should not be entitled 
to receive a share of the value of that house. In this case, 
there is no question but that the equipment purchased by the 
partnership still has substantial value and half of that value 
should be credited to the plaintiffs. 
In addition to the value of the equipment the lower court 
should have also considered the value of the good will of the 
partnership as well as any other valuation of an on-going 
business. 68 C.J.S., Partnership, §396, p. 910. The lower 
court should hear evidence as to the typical ways in which a 
business is valued at the time it is dissolved. 
Because of this, the case should be remanded to the 
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District Court for the purpose of conducting an evidentiary 
hearing as to the market value of the company at the time 
the dissolution occurred. 
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS MATHEMATICAL 
COMPUTATION OF PLAINTIFF'S OBLIGATION FOR 
THE ALLEGED LOSS SUSTAINED BY THE BUSINESS. 
The lower court at the conclusion of the trial made the 
following statement from the bench: 
It has also been testified to several times 
Mr. Sather wanted to take these write-offs on his 
tax return. For that reason I am also granting 
judgment in the sum of $6,000 to the defendant for 
the losses which Mr. Sather failed to pay but I am 
confident took off on his own tax returns. (Tr. 
p. 218). 
The conclusion of the trial court that the plaintiff was liable 
for $6,000 of business loss was converted to the following 
language by Defendant's attorney in the signed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
At the time the partnership was terminated on 
December 31, 1978, Plaintiff was also responsible 
for one-half of the losses and debts of the partner-
ship which losses included operating expenses during 
the term of the partnership, tax liabilities, tax 
benefits received by the plaintiff and not by the 
defendant and interest for a total loss of at least 
$12,000. (Tr. p. 130). 
This finding is incorrect for several reasons. First, 
there is no evidence to justify the assessment of a $6,000 loss 
to Plaintiff. Mr. Pitcher himself testified that by his own 
accounting sheet there was a total loss of $9,80 0. (Tr. p. 56; 
Ex. 5). He further stated that this loss was partially covered 
by not paying some of the obligations including the Internal 
Revenue. (Tr. pp. 56-57). Thus, even completing disbelieving 
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Plaintiff's evidence that a substantial profit had been made 
in the business and completely believeing the evidence of 
Defendant there at the most would be a loss of $9,800 at the 
termination of the agreement. Plaintiff would therefore only 
be responsible for a maximum of $4,900 even applying these 
figures. However, part of this obligation included the unpaid 
withholding taxes payable to the Internal Revenue. Since it 
is undisputed that Plaintiff was forced to pay approximately 
$1,900 to the I.R.S. after his other bank accounts were attached 
Plaintiff should have received a credit of $1,993 for his 
expenditure. At the most, therefore, Plaintiff would be liable 
for a $2,900 existing business loss. 
The remainder of the lower court's finding relating to 
tax benefits is totally irrelevant. Whether or not the plaintiff 
received a tax benefit from claimed losses in the business is 
a matter between him and the IRS and Defendant should in no case 
receive a credit for any alleged improper claim on Plaintiff's 
federal taxes. 
A second reason why this finding is incorrect is simply 
that the defendants never proved that the outstanding debts of 
the company had been satisifed. Since Defendants subsequently 
filed bankruptcy after the operation of their own company it is 
unknown whether these debts to which Plaintiff is now being 
charged were ever in fact paid. If they were not paid then 
the obligation goes to the creditor and not to reimburse 
Defendants for a debt which they did not sustain. 
Finally, the lower court failed to take into account the 
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principle that a partnership obligation must be paid out of 
firm assets before any partner is entitled to any part of the 
assets or is liable for his proportionate share of any debt. 
68 C.J.S., Partnership, §389, p. 902; West v. West, 403 P.2d 
22, 25-26 (Utah 1965). 
Had the assets of the partnership been liquidated at the 
time of the dissolution as is legally required rather than 
having the defendants unilaterally take possession of all 
assets and immediately convert them to their own business, it 
is probable that there would be no business debts or losses 
for which the plaintiff would now be responsible. Since this 
was not done, however, the case should be remanded to the lower 
court for an exact accounting as to what obligations remained 
unpaid at the time of the dissolution and what obligations were 
in fact paid by the defendants. The lower court should also be 
instructed to give to Plaintiff a credit for the Internal Revenue 
debt which was paid by him. 
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN COMPUTING 
THE ALLEGED AMOUNT OWING BY PLAINTIFF 
TO DEFENDANT FOR RENTAL OF DEFENDANT'S 
BUILDING AND, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, LACHES 
PRECLUDED DEFENDANTS FROM RAISING ANY 
CLAIM AS TO THE RENTAL OF THE BUILDING 
OR THE BASE RADIO STATIONS. 
Findings No. 10 and 11 of the lower court found that a 
reasonable rent for the building in which the business was 
operated in after leaving the jewelry store basement was $200 
a month for a total rental of $14,000. In addition, the 
court assessed the plaintiff with $6,600 for the rental of the 
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two base radio stations which were utilized in the jewelry 
stores of Plaintiff. (Tr. p. 130). 
Plaintiff does not believe it is proper to charge him 
with any rental amount whatsoever as will be discussed infra. 
However, even if such a charge is proper the mathematical 
computation was incorrect. Defendant Pitcher testified that 
in December of 19 73 he moved the business operation from the 
basement of the jewelry store to his building located one mile 
east of Roosevelt. (Tr. p. 31). He later testified that in 
January of 1979 he began his own business operation at the 
same location. (Tr. p. 4 3). Finally, he testified that the 
reasonable amount to rent his building during this period of 
time was $200.00 a month based upon comparable rents in the 
same area. (Tr. pp. 194-195). A simple mathematical calculation 
shows that there are 6 0 months between January of 1974 and 
January of 1979. At $200 a month this would be a total rental 
of $12,000—not $14,000 as found by the lower court. Since 
Plaintiff was responsible for half of this amount he is 
entitled to a $1,000 credit. 
In addition, Plaintiff was assessed $6,679 for the rental 
of the two base stations between 19 73 to August of 19 81 when 
the two stations were removed by the defendant. This figure 
is further broken down into $3,579 from the beginning of the 
partnership until its dissolution and $3,021 from the time of 
its dissolution until the possession of the stations by the 
defendant. (Tr. pp. 193-194). 
Defendant admitted on cross examination that he never 
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requested Plaintiff to pay the company a monthly rental for 
his building nor did he request a rental for the two base 
stations located at the plaintiff's jewelry stores. None of 
these claims were made until after the lawsuit had been filed. 
(Tr. pp. 196-199) . 
The lower court refused to entertain the defense of laches 
raised by Plaintiff's attorney on the basis that it had not been 
stated as an affirmative defense in Plaintiff's Reply to 
Defendant's Counterclaim. (Tr. pp. 212-213). On the other 
hand, the doctrine of laches and the statute of limitations 
had been raised by the defendant in his Answer. Defendant's 
counsel in closing argument stated: 
We have raised in our answers to the defense 
the statutes of limitations and laches, and I think 
those have some real merit, that the court consider 
them. This case sat for a long time, and there has 
been arguments about accountings claimed to have 
happened in 1972, yet nothing happens until 1981. 
The statute of limitations is really hard to tell 
when the cause of action arose. Maybe it arose on 
January 1 of 1979. If it did it probably did not 
run, but laches may be applicable here. (Tr. p. 205). 
While admittedly Plaintiff's lower court counsel should 
have raised laches in his Reply to the Counterclaim the failure 
to do so certainly should not have precluded its application in 
this case since it was of no surprise to the defendants that 
such a defense existed since both parties were making identical 
types of claims and defenses. This Court recently reaffirmed 
the rule that the purpose of Rule 8(c) is to insure that the 
parties have adequate notice of the issues and the facts of a 
case and not to preclude a valid defense for a technical defect 
in the pleadings. Price Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown & 
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Gunnell, Inc., 25 Utah Adv. Rep. 47 (January 9, 1986). This 
Court as early as 1963 recognized that the mere failure to 
plead an affirmative defense does not preclude it if there is 
no surprise and if the evidence is consistent with such defense. 
Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86 (Utah 1963). There, this Court 
noted that Rules 15(b) and 54(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure allow a party the remedy of correcting defective 
technical pleadings when there is no prejudice to the opposing 
party. See also, Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690 
(Utah 1977); FMA Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 404 P.2d 670 
(Utah 1970). 
The lower court therefore was incorrect in concluding that 
the issue of laches could not be raised by the plaintiff since 
it had not been plead in the Reply to the Counterclaim. Laches 
is applicable in this case since there is evidence both as to 
the lack of diligence on the part of the defendant and an injury 
to the plaintiff owing to such lack of diligence. Papanikolas 
Bros. Enterprises v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center, 535 P.2d 1256 
(Utah 1975) . Had Defendant notified Plaintiff at the inception 
of the agreement that he was expecting rent for his building 
Plaintiff may have found a more suitable building at a lower 
cost. Likewise, had he been informed that he would be paying 
for the base stations he may have decided to buy them himself 
since the value of the stations is less than the amount of rent 
ultimately charged to the plaintiff. In addition, since this 
is a case of equity the principle that equity aids the vigilant 
is applicable. Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976) . 
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This principle is even more apparent when the base rental 
station is further divided. After Defendant had unilaterally 
decided to terminate the agreement he allowed Plaintiff to 
continue to operate the two base stations for over two and a 
half years before he finally removed them. During this period 
of time he never informed the plaintiff that he would be charging 
him a competitive lease payment nor did he give him any notice 
whatsoever that he would be paying for the use of these stations 
that he had had in his business operation for some nine years. 
For these reasons, therefore, the lower court erred in 
computing the amount of rent plaintiff was ultimately liable 
for and, further erred in assessing any rent whatsoever. 
CONCLUSION 
This case illustrates the principle that the best laid 
plans of mice and men often go astray. Both the plaintiff and 
the defendant entered into a business relationship for the purpose 
of enhancing their financial status. Neither was concerned about 
the legal technicalities of what they called their agreement and 
each attempted to assist the other in the operation of the 
business. When the relationship finally broke down the 
defendant merely took the practical approach he thought best, 
changed names and bank accounts, and continued to run the 
operation with the same equipment and inventory. Again, no 
formal dissolution of partnership occurred since Defendant was 
not concerned nor aware of the legal requirement for such 
dissolution. 
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When this action was subsequently filed even the lawyers 
in the case viewed the relationship differently. The issues 
were clearly not well framed and the evidence was not presented 
by either side in a consistent manner based upon partnership 
principles. It is understandable why the lower court made these 
accounting errors since the division of assets and liabilities 
was not cohesively presented by either side. 
Nevertheless, both parties in this agreement are entitled 
to a fair dissolution of their relationship. This Court with 
its equitable powers has a duty to correct the errors of the 
lower court relating to the distribution of assets and liabilities. 
Clearly, Plaintiff is entitled to a full accounting as to the 
market value of all assets of the partnership at the time of its 
dissolution regardless of whether such assets have been depreciated 
for tax purposes. Likewise, Plaintiff is entitled to certain 
credits discussed above and is further entitled to an accounting 
as to what debts have actually been paid by the defendant and 
what debts remain unpaid. 
Finally, the doctrine of laches was a proper defense in 
this matter and should have been allowed by the lower court 
even though it had not been pleaded. Under such doctrine the 
claims of Defendant for rents when such claims were never 
asserted during the entire tenure of the partnership agreement 
should not be allowed. 
For the preceding reasons, therefore, it is respectfully 
submitted that this matter be remanded to the lower court for 
further proceedings in determining a fair and just accounting 
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between the parties. 
Respectfully submitted this 31st day of March, 1986. 
Craig ^ £ook 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellants to Gayle McKeachnie 
and Clark B. Allred, Attorneys for Defendants - Respondents, 
363 East Main Street, Vernal, Utah 84078 this 31st day of 
March, 19 86. 
ADDENDUM 
A G R E E M E N T 
This Agreement, made and entered into this c?ci±T~ day of L^Mi^LZ^Jr-
ls/7'2 by and between R, R. SATHER, hereinafter called "Sather", and 
WILLIAM E. PITCHER, Jr., hereinafter called "Pitcher", 
W I T N E S S E T H ? 
1. That the parties hereto agree to enter into the business of 
Television and Electronic repairs and service, and Sather agrees as follows: 
a. To furnish shop from which the business is to be conducted, 
b. To furnish necessary equipment, to operate the business, including 
test equipment, and other equipment reasonably necessary to 
conduct the same, and to provide for and furnish an inventory 
of tubes, parts and other materials that may be required in 
the business. 
2. That Pitcher agrees to spend his full time and effort in the 
said business and to whatever he can to secure business and to operate the 
business in a good and workmanlike manner. 
3. That it is agreed that the business shall be owned by Sather, 
that Pitcher is to be compensated for his services as follows: 
a. To receive &07. of all of the labor and 20% of all of the 
parts and materials used in connection with radio and television 
repairs and service. 
b. To receive 60% of the labor and 10% of all parts and materials 
used In the service and operation of the Communications part of 
the business. 
4. That Sather shalalfurnish a suitable service truck for use in 
the said business, it is agreed that time for the service truck, while on 
business purposes shall be billed to customers at the rate of .35c per mile, 
with Pitcher to receive the sum of .15c per mile, and the sum of .20 cents 
per mile to go for truck expenses and maintenance* 
5. That in the event that Pitcher does repair and service work 
for gather in connection with Sather Jewely Company, then such work shall be 
billed to Sather at the regular shop and service call rates. 
6. That it is agreed that at least monthly, an accounting shall 
be had, both as to labor and for parts. 
7. That it is hereby agreed that Pitcher will pay his own 
social security, income tax, and workmans compensation, and that Sather shall 
not be responsible for the same. 
- I -
8. That the said Pitcher shall have the option during the term 
of this agreement to purchase the entire business, the purchase price shall 
be determined on the basis of the eoet of equipment, less depreciation, 
plus all of the Inventory of parts, tubes, supplies, etc. 
9. That It Is agreed that all of the expenses of the business, 
rent, utilities, taxes and other necessary business expenses shall be 
deducted before a division Is made of the proceeds M set forth In paragraph 
3, hereof. 
10. That work done for Satber Jewelry, set forth In paragraph 5, 
hereof, all parts and materlale used shall be at wholesale coat of the same. 
11. That It Is agreed that this agreement may be terminated by 
either of the parties at any time, that upon termination It la agreed that 
as accounting In full shall be had between the parties within three (3) 
days after such termination* 
12. That all of the bills, Invoicing and "paper work" In connection 
with the buslues shall be the responsibility of Pitcher. 
WITNESS the hands of the parties hereto this day of 
, 1972. 
R. R. Sather 
WITNESS: 
William E. Pitcher, Jr. 
8. That it is agreed that thlaaagreement may be terminated by 
either of the parties at any time, that upon termination it la agreed that 
an accounting In full shall be had between the parties within three (4) days 
after such termination. 
9« That all of the bills,, Invoicing and "paper work1' in connection 
with the business shall be the responsibility of Pitcher, 
WITNESS the hands of the parties hereto this day of 
— , 1972. 
R. R. Sether 
William E. Pitcher, Jr. 
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TYPED REPRODUCTION OF HANDWRITTEN NOTES APPEARING 
ON BACK OF PAGE 3 OF EXHIBIT 2. 
"Purchase option" buy (blue ink) 
Business expenses to go taken off the top at 50-50 rent and 
utilities and taxes of profits before draw (blue ink) 
Change 3 to partnership (black ink) 
Store services charge parts only at wholesale cost (blue ink) 
Okay agreement as listed above and front two pages 
ss/ R. R. Sather (blue ink) 


























THE CLERK: HOW ABOUT 35? 
MR. ALLRED: 35 AND 26, NEITHER ONE WERE. 
THE CLERK: 35 OR 26? 
MR. ALLRED: MY RECORD SHOWS THAT. 
THE CLERK: 26 WAS OFFERED AND RECEIVED. IT'S A 
LETTER. 
MR. ALLRED: I BETTER GIVE IT BACK TO YOU. I 
DIDN'T THINK IT HAD. 
THE COURT: WAS THE '82 TAX RETURNS EVER OFFERED? 
MR. ALLRED: YES. 
THE COURT: WE TALKED ABOUT IT A LOT. 
THE CLERK: YES. I HAVE IT AS OFFERED AND 
RECEIVED. 
THE COURT: OKAY. RECEIVED, THEN. 
THE CLERK: I HAVE THE DOCUMENT HERE. 
35 I DO NOT HAVE OFFERED. 
I DON'T, EITHER. 
THE COURT: WELL, WE HAVE GOT THE HOUSEKEEPING DONE. 
THIS MATTER BOILS DOWN TO A QUESTION OF WHO DO I 
BELIEVE. IT REALLY BOILS DOWN TO WHETHER WE HAVE A PARTNER-
SHIP OR WE HAVE A PROPRIETORSHIP. IT REALLY BOILS DOWN TO 
EXHIBIT NO. 2, AND THOSE FOUR LITTLE WORDS, AS COUNSEL POINTS 
OUT, WHETHER ORNOT THE COURT CHOOSES TO ACCEPT THOSE OR NOT 
ACCEPT THOSE. WHAT THAT COMES DOWN TO IS A QUESTION OF WEIGHT 




1 JURIES ABOUT THIS, AND PERHAPS WE PAY MORE ATTENTION TO IT 
2 WHEN A JURY IS PRESENT. HOWEVER, THE COURT IS THE FINDER OF 
3 FACT THE SAME AS THE JURY, AND THE COURT HAS TO DETERMINE 
4 WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS ADEQUATE WEIGHT, ADEQUATE SUFFICIENCY. 
5 AND WHETHER OR NOT THE WITNESSES ARE CREDIBLE. 
6 IN DOING SO I ASK THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS OF MYSELF. 
7 AND I WROTE THESE DOWN. FIRST, WHY DID THE PLAINTIFF BOTHER 
8 TO MAKE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE DEFENDANT? HE HAD HIM WORKING 
9 FOR HIM ON THE SAME TERMS HE TESTIFIED. I THINK BOTH 
10 TESTIFIED TO THAT. WHY WAS THERE ANY NEED TO MAKE AN AGREE-
11 MENT? 
12 SECOND OF ALL IF THE DEFENDANT IS A MERE EMPLOYEE 
13 WHY WAS HE REQUIRED TO MAKE ANY KIND OF AN ACCOUNTING? IT 
14 CONFUSES ME. 
15 NOW, IN THE AGREEMENT IT WAS VERY CAREFULLY DONE 
16 TO EXCLUDE THE PAYMENT OF ANY EMPLOYEE COSTS, PLACING THAT 
17 BURDEN OVER UPON THE DEFENDANT, MR. PITCHER. WHY IN THIS 
18 TYPE OF AGREEMENT, WHICH ONE SIDE SAYS IS AN EMPLOYMENT 
19 AGREEMENT, WOULD THERE BE A BUY-OUT PROVISION? IT'S INCON-
20 " SISTENT. IF THERE WAS A BUY-OUT AGREEMENT WHY WAS IT REFUSED 
21 WHY WERE THE TERMS IN ITEM 27 SO ONE-SIDED THAT THEY WERE 
22 IMPOSSIBLE TO MEET? WHY WAS ALL THE BUSINESS — SOME OF THESE 
23 ARE QUOTES FROM TESTIMONY, OR NEAR QUOTES. WHY WAS ALL THE 
24 BUSINESS LEFT UP TO THE DEFENDANT? MR. SATHER MENTIONED 
25 ONE TIME WHEN THE QUESTION WAS MADE ABOUT HIS PROMISSORY NOTE' 
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1 THAT THAT WAS ONLY WHEN WE WENT TO GET SURVIVOR'S INSURANCE. 
2 SURVIVOR'S INSURANCE IS ABSOLUTELY INCONSISTENT WITH AN 
3 EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP. DEFENDANT WAS REQUIRED TO 
4 SIGN PROMISSORY NOTES. IF HE WAS AN EMPLOYEE WHY SHOULD HE 
5 BOTHER? THEY WOULDN'T BE HIS OBLIGATION WHATSOEVER. 
6 THEN THERE WERE FOUR OR FIVE STATEMENTS THAT WELL 
7 IN THE DEPOSITION THE REPORTER MUST HAVE MADE A MISTAKE. YET 
8 IT WAS SWORN TO. THE COURT FOUND NUMEROUS INCONSISTENT 
9 STATEMENTS UNDER OATH. THE COURT DISCOVERED TESTIMONY WHICH 
10 KEPT CHANGING A LITTLE BIT UNDER OATH. THE COURT FINDS THE 
11
 TESTIMONY OFFERED BY MR. SATHER TO BE WORTH LITTLE TO BELIEVE. 
12 IT APPEARS TO ME THAT WHAT WE ATTEMPTED TO GET HERE, 
13 WHAT THE TRUTH REALLY IS HERE, AND THAT'S WHAT I'M CHARGED 
14 WITH FINDING, WHAT WE REALLY ACQUIRED HERE IS MR. SATHER 
15 FOUND HIMSELF A REAL NICE TAX WRITEOFF AND HE FOUND A MAN 
16 OVER HERE WHO WAS SUCKER ENOUGH TO WORK FOR NOTHING. THAT'S 
17 WHAT IT BOILS DOWN TO. 
18 IN REGARD TO MR. CASPERSON'S TESTIMONY, I THINK 
19 MR. CASPERSON TESTIFIED AS HONESTLY AND TRUTHFULLY AND 
20 OPENLY AS HE POSSIBLY COULD. BUT HE WAS ONLY FURNISHED 
21 CERTAIN RECORDS. HE DOESN'T KNOW IF THEY WERE COMPLETE. 
22 NOBODY KNOWS IF THEY ARE COMPLETE. THEY ARE FOUR YEARS OLD. 
23 THEY HAD BEEN OUT OF STATE. SHIPPED AROUND. WE DON'T KNOW 
24 WHAT HAPPENED TO THOSE RECORDS, AND AS A RESULT I CAN GIVE 
25 HIS TESTIMONY LITTLE CREDENCE, BY HIS OWN TESTIMONY. 
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1 BASED UPON WHAT I HAVE HEARD HERE TODAY, BASED 
2 UPON WHAT IS IN THE FILE, WITH THE TWO WRITS OF REPLEVIN, 
3 WITH THE IMPROPER FILING IN THE WRONG COUNTY, WITH ALL THE 
4 OTHER INCONSISTENCIES AND PROBLEMS THAT WE HAVE IN THIS 
5 CASE, THE COURT FINDS AS FOLLOWS: 
6 NUMBER 1, THE PARTIES ENTERED INTO A PARTNERSHIP 
7 AGREEMENT AS OF JANUARY 1, 1973, I BELIEVE IT WAS. 
8 MR. ALLRED: T72. 
9 THE COURT: EXCUSE ME. 
10 BASED UPON THAT PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT THERE HAS 
11 BEEN A BREACH IN THAT THE PLAINTIFF, MR. SATHER, FAILED TO 
12 LIVE UP TO THE TERMS OF HIS AGREEMENT. 
13 THERE WAS A SUBSEQUENT BREACH WHEN THE DEFENDANT 
14 TOOK THE EQUIPMENT AND STARTED USING IT AT HIS OWN BUSINESS. 
15 CONSEQUENTLY, I GRANT JUDGMENT AS FOLLOWS. FOR 
16 THE RENTS FOR THE BASE STATIONS OWED TO THE PARTNERSHIP, FOR 
17 THE AMOUNT OWED ON RADIO AND TELEVISION REPAIRS AND FOR THE 
18 RENT ON THE BUILDINGS, ONE-HALF OF THAT, WHICH IS MR. 
19 SATHER'S SHARE, WHICH HE OWES $10,716.86. I AWARD ATTORNEY 
20 FEES IN THE SUM OF $480.00, MAKING A FINDING THAT YES INDEED 
21 THERE WAS AN ABUSE OF PROCESS IN THIS CASE. 
22 HOWEVER, I THINK THAT MR. SATHER IS ENTITLED TO 
23 ONE-HALF OF THE VALUE OF THE ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT AND THAT 
24 ACQUIRED, PLUS THE INVENTORY. TESTIMONY HAS BEEN THE EQUIP-
25 MENT WAS TOTALLY DEPRECIATED. INVENTORY WAS APPROXIMATELY 
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THAT AMOUNTS TO ONE-HALF OF THAT OR $6,500. 
IT'S ALSO BEEN TESTIFIED TO SEVERAL TIMES MR. 
WANTED TO TAKE THESE WRITEOFFS ON HIS TAX RETURN. FOR 
ASON I'M ALSO GRANTING JUDGMENT IN THE SUM OF $6,000.00 
DEFENDANT FOR THE LOSSES WHICH MR. SATHER FAILED TO 
I'M CONFIDENT TOOK OFF ON HIS OWN TAX RETURNS. I 
THAT TOTALS $10,696.88 FOR THE DEFENDANT, TOGETHER 
URT COSTS. 
ANY QUESTIONS? 
MR. ALLRED: THAT CAME TO TEN THOUSAND— 
THE COURT: $10,696.88, IF MY FIGURES ARE CORRECT, 
f80. 
MR. ALLRED: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. I'LL PREPARE 
JS AND A JUDGMENT ACCORDINGLY. 
CWHEREUPON THIS HEARING WAS CONCLUDED.) 
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CLARK B. ALLRED 
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Defendants 
363 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (801) 789-4908 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
R.R. SATHER and R.R. SATHER ] 
dba SATHERS COMMUNICATIONS ] 




WILLIAM E. PITCHER, JR., 
PITCHER COMMUNICATION 
ELECTRONICS, a corporation, 
DWIGHT PITCHER, VERNA PITCHER 1 
and JOHN DOES ONE and TWO, ' 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 11,156 
The above captioned matter came before the Court for trial 
on September 16, 1985, at 9:30 a.m. Plaintiff, R.R. Sather, was 
present and represented by his attorney, Anthony Famulary. 
Defendant, William E. Pitcher, Jr., was present and represented 
by his attorney, Clark B. Allred. The other Defendants have 
filed bankruptcy and notice of the bankruptcy filing is contained 
within the file. Testimony from various witnesses, together with 
documentary evidence was received by the Court and the Court 
being fully advised and having heard the testimony and examined 
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the following Findings of Fact. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff, R.R. Sather, and Defendant, William E. 
Pitcher, Jr., entered into an agreement dated January 1, 1972. 
The agreement is Exhibit No. 2. 
2. One of the major issues before the Court is whether the 
agreement created a partnership as claimed by the Defendant or 
was a sole proprietorship arrangement as claimed by the 
Plaintiff. 
3. A determination of the issues in this case is primarily 
dependent upon the creditability of the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant. Based on the demeanor of the Plaintiff, the 
inconsistent statements, the responses given on the witness stand 
and the positions taken by the Plaintiff, the Court finds that 
little creditability should be given to the Plaintiff's 
testimony. 
4. The agreement of the parties, together with the actions 
of the parties, are more consistent with the arrangement being a 
partnership rather than a sole proprietorship. The Court finds 
that the facts are more consistent with the arrangement being a 
partnership. Those facts include the preparing and signing of a 
written agreement which is unusual in an employer/employee 
relationship, a requirement that the Defendant provide an 
accounting, the provision for a buy-out by the Defendant, 
Plaintiff's response to Defendant's proposed buy-out, the 
2 
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discussion regarding survivorship insurance, the fact that 
Defendant was responsible for the work and the inconsistent 
statements of the Plaintiff regarding what the arrangement was 
together with express language contained on the back of Exhibit 
2. 
5. The Court received testimony regarding an accounting 
provided by the Plaintiff and an accounting provided by the 
Defendant• The Court finds that the accounting provided by the 
Plaintiff can be given very little weight in that it was 
undisputed that not all documents had been examined by the 
accountant, cash disbursements for expenses were not included and 
the records relied on by Plaintiff's accountant had not been in 
the possession of the accountantf but for three years had been in 
the possession of an accounting firm in California with no 
explanation given as to whether any documents had been removed, 
lost, changed or altered. 
6. The Plaintiff breached the terms of the parties 
agreement dated January 1, 1972, by his failure to provide a 
shop, to pay for personal repair and service work or to provide a 
truck or other equipment. In general the Plaintiff basically 
ignored the terms of the parties agreement. 
7. Defendant generally complied with the terms of the 
agreement until December 31, 1978, at which time he terminated 
the agreement by starting a new business entity. 
8. When Defendant terminated the business on December 31, 
3 
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1978, Plaintiff was entitled to receive one-half of the value of 
the assets at that time. The assets of the partnership on 
December 31, 1978, included equipment which was fully depreciated 
and had no value and inventory of approximately $13,000.00. 
9. At the time the partnership was terminated on December 
31, 1978, Plaintiff was also responsible for one-half of the 
losses and debts of the partnership which losses included 
operating expenses during the term of the partnership, tax 
liabilities, tax benefits received by the Plaintiff and not by 
the Defendant and interest for a total loss of at least 
$12,000.00. 
10. Plaintiff, pursuant to the parties agreement, was 
responsible to provide a building for use of the partnership. 
The Plaintiff failed to provide that building and so the 
Defendant was required to provide the building. A reasonable 
rent for the building was $200.00 per month for a total rental of 
$14,000.00. 
11. Plaintiff used, during the term of the partnership and 
even after the partnership was terminated, two base stations 
which belong to the partnership. Plaintiff had agreed to pay a 
reasonable rental for those base stations, but failed to do so. 
A reasonable rental for those base stations during the time 
period they were in the Plaintiff's possession was $6,600.79. 
12. Plaintiff had agreed to pay the partnership for any 
repairs made to equipment owned by the Plaintiff. Plaintiff 
4 
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incurred repair expenses of $832.98 which he has failed to pay. 
13. The Plaintiff treated the arrangement between the 
parties as a means whereby he could claim substantial tax 
benefits without incurring any work or expense and requiring the 
Defendant to do all the work and incur the expense which is 
contrary to the terms of the party's agreement. 
14. In Augustf 1981, Plaintiff signed an Affidavit and 
Judge Bullock, relying on the Affidavit, issued a Pre-judgment 
Writ of Replevin and an Order to Show Cause requiring the 
Defendant to appear before the Court on August 24, 1981. The 
Plaintiff, when signing the Affidavit under oath, had no facts 
which showed immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage and 
there was no basis for the issuance of the Pre-judgment Writ 
without notice to the Defendant. 
15. Defendant, on being served with the Pre-judgment Writ 
of Replevin and the Order to Show Cause, appeared before the 
Court on August 24, 1981. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel 
appeared at that time and therefore the Writ was dismissed. 
16. In September, 1981, the Plaintiff signed an identical 
Affidavit and presented the same to a different Judge, Judge Sam, 
to obtain another Pre-judgment Writ of Replevin. No notice was 
given to the Defendant or his counsel of the Writ. The Plaintiff 
had no facts to support his claim of immediate and irreparable 
injury. 
17. Pursuant to the Order to Show Cause which accompanied 
5 
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the second Writ of Replevin, the Defendant again appeared before 
the Court and the Court found at that time that venue was 
improper and ordered the case transferred to Uintah County, Utah. 
18. Defendant, to avoid other continued legal hassels, 
agreed to file a bond guaranteeing that the two base stations 
would be available in the event the Court ruled that Plaintiff 
was entitled to the same. 
19. Defendant incurred legal fees in the amount of $480.00 
contesting the two Writs of Replevin. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the preceding Findings of Fact, the Court makes the 
following Conclusions of Laws. 
1. Plaintiff, R.R. Sather, and Defendant, William E. 
Pitcher, Jr., entered into a partnership whereby they were to 
split expenses, profits and losses 50-50. That partnership had a 
term beginning January 1, 1972 and terminated on December 31, 
1978. 
2. The testimony of Plaintiff, Sather, is to be given 
little credence. 
3. The accounting provided by Plaintiff, Sather, is to be 
given little credence. 
4. The accounting of the partnership shows that the 
Plaintiff owes to Defendant the sum of $6000.00 as his 50% share 
of the loss of the business and $10,716.88 for Plaintiff's 50% 
share for the rent of the building, the base stations and repairs 
6 
which Plaintiff had failed to pay to the partnership. 
5. Defendant owes to Plaintiff the sum of $6,500.00 for 
Plaintiff's 50% share of the assets of the partnership. 
6. The obtaining of the two Pre-judgment Writs of Replevin 
by the Plaintiff was in violation of Rule 6 4A of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, was done intentionally without notice and 
with malice and Defendant incurred damages of $480.00 in legal 
fees as a result of the wrongful actions of the Plaintiff. 
7. When amounts owed by the Defendant to Plaintiff is 
deducted from the amount owed by Plaintiff to Defendant, the 
resulting balance that Plaintiff owes to Defendant is the sum of 
$10,696.88 for which Defendant is entitled to judgment. 
DATED this y day of September, 1985. 
* i_' 




OCT 3 1985 
BY. DEDUTY 
CLARK B. ALLRED 
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Defendants 
363 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (801) 789-4908 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
R.R. SATHER and R.R. SATHER 
dba SATHERS COMMUNICATIONS 




WILLIAM E. PITCHER, JR., 
PITCHER COMMUNICATION 
ELECTRONICS, a corporation, 
DWIGHT PITCHER, VERNA PITCHER 
and JOHN DOES ONE and TWO, 
Defendants. 
The above captioned matter having come before the Court on 
September 16, 1985, for trial and the Court having entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and being fully advised, 
hereby; 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that: 
1. Defendant, William E. Pitcher, Jr., have judgment 
against Plaintiff, R.R. Sather, in the amount of $10,696.88, 
together with costs. 
2. The undertaking previously filed herein on behalf of the 
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Defendant regarding the base stations is hereby discharged, 
DATED this / day of-September, 19 85. 
Richard C. Davidson 
District Judge 
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